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Can the Discursively Privileged Think?: 
A Re-Articulation of Social Justice 
Alex Christison In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  be	  interrogating	  Gayatri	  Chakravorty	  Spivak’s	  Can	  the	  Subaltern	  
Speak?	  and	  Wendy	  Brown’s	  Wounded	  Attachments,	  applying	  their	  critiques	  of	  the	  subject	  to	  explore	   a	   possible	   re-­‐articulation	   of	   the	   social	   justice	   framework.	   Brown	   problematizes	  identities	  rooted	  in	  injury,	  while	  Spivak	  problematizes	  exterior	  and	  interior	  representation	  by	   intellectuals	   of	   subaltern	   voices.	   Both	   theorists	   denounce	   ‘good	   intentions’	   as	   a	  beneGicial	  factor	  in	  emancipation,	  which	  leaves	  contemporary	  social	  justice	  articulations	  at	  a	   standstill.	   Social	   justice	   is	   premised	   on	   egalitarianism,	   which	   is	   both	   endorsed	   and	  contradicted	  within	  modern	  liberal	  democratic	  discourse	  (Brown,	  1993,	  p.	  400).	  Adding	  to	  this	   tension,	   identities	   rooted	   in	   injury	  must	   become	   invested	   in	   their	   own	   impotence	   to	  express	   and	   contest	   their	   subjectiGication	   (p.	  403),	  while	   those	  with	  access	   to	  hegemonic	  power,	  such	  as	  intellectuals,	  cannot	  speak	  for	  those	  lacking	  access	  without	  reproducing	  and	  making	  transparent	  the	  very	  relations	  and	  ideals	  that	  originally	  silenced	  and	  excluded	  them	  (Spivak,	  1988,	  p.	  292).	  Combining	  the	  alternative	  suggestions	  given	  by	  Spivak	  and	  Brown,	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  re-­‐articulation	   of	   social	   justice	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   deconstruction	   and	   destabilization	   of	   all	  aspects	   of	   any	   discursively	   privileged	   consciousness,	   be	   it	   white,	   male,	   middle-­‐class,	   or	  heterosexual	  consciousness.	  This	  movement	  is	  grounded	  in	  a	  political	  model	  based	  on	  Gluid	  desire,	   rather	   than	   Gixed	   interest,	   to	   become	  Nietzsche’s	   	   ‘angry	   spectator’	  who	   can	   be	   a	  ‘redeemer	   of	   history,’	   while	   reemphasizing	   translation	   as	   both	   a	   powerful	   tool	   and	   an	  imperfect	   process.	   I	   will	   begin	   by	   outlining	   Spivak	   and	   Brown’s	   critiques	   of	   the	   subject,	  followed	   by	   a	   re-­‐articulation	   of	   social	   justice	   that	   avoids	   the	   deGiciencies	   illuminated	   by	  these	   authors.	   This	   discussion	  will	   be	   highlighted	   by	   a	   self-­‐reGlective	   and	   deconstructive	  view	  of	  my	  own	  consciousness	  as	  a	  middle-­‐class	  white	  male	  within	  a	  university	  institution.	  	  Spivak’s	   (1988)	   Can	   the	   Subaltern	   Speak?	   is	   a	   direct	   confrontation	   with	   Western	  intellectual	   thought’s	   assumed	   capacity	   as	   a	   neutral	   and	   objective	   investigator	   of	   the	  colonial	   subject,	   or	   subaltern,	  who	   lacks	   access	   to	   hegemonic	   power.	   Spivak	   interrogates	  Karl	  Marx’s	   two	   translations	   of	   representation,	  which	   are	   distinct	   yet	   conGlated	   by	   Gilles	  Deleuze	   and	  Michel	   Foucault	   (p.	   275).	   First,	  vertreten:	   to	   represent,	   ‘as	   standing	   in’	   for	   a	  subject	   whose	   consciousness	   is	   dislocated	   (p.	   277),	   such	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Western	  intellectuals	   speaking	   for	   subaltern	   interest.	   Second,	   dartelling:	   to	   re-­‐present	   (p.	   275),	  ‘constituting’	  subjects	  under	  a	  collective	  or	  amalgamation	  (Maggio,	  2007,	  p.	  422),	  such	  as	  subalterns	  speaking	  for	  all	  subalterns,	  and	  only	  on	  subaltern	  affairs.	  Either	  through	  being	  spoken	   for	  or	  being	   ‘permitted’	   to	  speak,	  subalterns	  are	  dually	  silenced	  and	  marginalized	  through	  representation,	  and	  thus	  are	  excluded	  from	  shaping	  a	  discourse	  on	  their	  lives	  and	  realities	  (Maggio,	  2007,	  p.	  426).	  Western	  intellectuals	  discuss	  the	  subaltern	  under	  a	  colonizing	  framework	  that	  views	  knowledge	   as	   an	   extractable	   resource,	   appropriating	   knowledge	   and	   rearticulating	   it	  through	   their	   hegemonic	   vocabulary,	   while	   ignoring	   “the	   epistemic	   violence	   of	   [an]	  imperialism”	   that	   re-­‐inscribes	   the	   ‘third	   world’	   as	   other	   (Spivak,	   1988,	   p.	   289).	   This	  approach	  neutralizes	  the	  ideologies	  within	  these	  theorists’	  “intellectual	  and	  economic	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history”	   (p.	  272),	  denouncing	   the	   intricate	   tie	  between	   intellectual	  production	  and	  Western	  economic	  interests	  (p.	  271),	  rendering	  theorists’	  positions	  as	  transparent	  (p.	  275).	  Transparency	   serves	   to	  normalize	   the	  position	  of	   the	   investigator,	  while	   constructing	   the	  object	  of	  investigation	  as	  ‘Other’	  deGined	  by	  difference.	  In	  response	  to	  this	  tendency,	  Spivak	  champions	  Derrida’s	  approach	  to	  avoiding	  too	  great	  a	  transparency	  through	  always	  locating	  oneself	   explicitly	   in	   one’s	   own	  discourse	   (p.	   293),	   as	   a	   “self-­‐aware	  philosopher”	   (Maggio,	  2007,	  p.	  424).	  	  From	   a	   Derridean	   framework,	   Spivak	   criticizes	   Foucault	   and	   Deleuze	   for	   their	  assumption	   that	   the	   subaltern	   “can	   speak	   and	   know	   their	   conditions”	   (p.	   283),	   which	  essentializes	   the	  subaltern	  as	  having	  homogeneous	  subjectivity	  and	   interest	  (p.	  284),	  and	  forgets	  that	  such	  messages	  do	  not	  become	  digestible,	  or	  audible,	  until	  they	  conform	  to	  the	  language	  of	  dominant	  interests	  (Maggio,	  2007,	  p.	  431).	  Through	  this	  essentializing	  process	  subaltern	  subjectivity	  is	  romanticized,	  valued	  as	  a	  ‘pure’	  oppressive	  consciousness	  (Maggio,	  2007,	  p.	  425),	  the	  solution	  to	  oppression,	  and	  as	  superior	  to	  that	  of	  the	  intellectual	  (Spivak,	  1988,	   p.	   274)	  who	   ironically	   re-­‐inscribes	   their	  marginality.	   Thus,	   the	   subaltern	   can	   only	  speak	  as	  a	  representative	  for	  the	  subaltern,	  on	  subaltern	  matters,	  and	  only	  in	  the	  language	  of	   the	   hegemonic	   power,	   which	   paradoxically	   requires	   a	   removal	   from	   the	   subaltern	  position,	  and	  thus	  silences	  their	  valorized	  speech	  (Maggio,	  2007,	  p.	  425).	  	  Brown	   (1993)	   discusses	   the	   paradoxes	   in	   modern	   liberal	   democracy,	   such	   as	   the	  tension	   between	   universal	   representation	   and	   individualism	   (p.	   391),	   to	   detail	   how	  difference	  has	  become	  depoliticized	  through	  normalized	  classiGications	  into	  social	  positions	  (p.	  393).	  Political	  membership	  in	  liberal	  democracy	  and	  ‘universal’	   interest	  are	  only	  made	  achievable	  through	  abstracting	  one’s	  life	  circumstances	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  power	  that	  have	  produced	  them,	  and	  identifying	  with	  a	  collective	  (p.	  392).	  Through	  this	  abstraction,	  liberal	  discourse	   neutralizes	   the	   potential	   for	   articulations	   of	   difference	   and	   exclusion	   to	   be	  subversive	  or	  critical	  of	  power	  relations,	   resulting	   in	  a	  conGlation	  of	  political	   identity	  and	  political	   interest	   (p.	   393).	   This	   conGlation	   collapses	   difference	   into	   a	   homogenous	  whole,	  constructed	   against	   a	   Gictitious	   yet	   paramount	   universal	   ‘we’,	   producing	   the	   potential	   for	  social	  identities	  to	  be	  managed	  by	  regulatory	  regimes	  of	  power	  (p.	  393).	  Out	  of	  this	  political	  context	   emerges	  modern	   ‘identity	  politics’,	  which	   serves	   to	   reify	  difference	  and	  exclusion	  into	  Gixed,	  depoliticized,	  categories	  while	  naturalizing	  capitalism	  (p.	  394).	  	  ‘Identity	   politics’	   of	  modern	   liberal	   democracy	   involves	   the	   separation	   of	   identity	  into	   discrete	   categories	   (race,	   sexuality,	   gender)	   in	   order	   to	   be	   politically	   meaningful.	  Brown	  (1993)	  suggests	  that	  this	  discourse	  has	  only	  become	  sensible	  through	  a	  normalizing	  of	   “bourgeois	   culture	   and	   economic	   values”	   through	   a	   re-­‐naturalization	   of	   capitalism	   (p.	  394).	  As	  capitalism	  has	  become	  re-­‐naturalized,	  identities	  based	  in	  the	  exclusion	  and	  injury	  caused	   by	   capitalism	  must	   instead	   look	   to	   marks	   of	   difference	   to	   explain	   suffering.	   The	  reduction	  of	  difference	  to	  observable	  social	  attributes	  does	  a	  disservice	  to	  identity	  through	  viewing	   difference	   as	   intrinsic,	   rather	   than	   the	   effects	   of	   power	   relations	   (p.	   399).	   Class	  based	  resentments	  are	  now	  reformulated	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   justice	  on	  the	  differential	  axes	  of	  gender,	   sexuality,	   and	   race,	   all	   of	  which	   position	   their	   claims	   against	   the	   standard	   of	   the	  white	  male	  bourgeois,	  who	  is	  granted	  “social	  acceptance,	  legal	  protection,	  relative	  material	  comfort,	   and	   social	   independence”	   (p.	   394).	   Without	   reference	   to	   the	   white	   masculine	  middle-­‐class	   ideal,	   injured	   identities	   lose	   their	   political	   signiGicance,	   being	   taken	   as	   a	  lamenting	   ‘I’	  opposing	   the	  universal	   ‘we’	   (p.	  395);	   identity	  based	   in	  exclusion	  requires	  an	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ideal	   to	   be	   excluded	   from.	   The	   symptom	   of	   this	   inexpressible	   suffering	   is	   that	   of	  ressentiment,	  which	  will	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  the	  social	  justice	  framework.	  	  Brown	  (1993)	  uses	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	  of	  ressentiment,	  or	  the	  “moralizing	  revenge	  of	  the	  powerless”,	  the	  weak	  triumphing	  as	  weak,	  to	  describe	  the	  synthesis	  that	  occurs	  when	  the	   paradoxes	   of	  modern	   liberal	   democracy	   are	   broken	   (p.	   400).	   All	   liberal	   subjects	   are	  vulnerable	  to	  ressentiment	  due	  to	  the	  assumptions	  of	  self-­‐reliance,	  which	  dislocates	  them	  from	  their	  situatedness	  within	  power	  relations	  (p.	  401).	  Ressentiment	  produces	  feelings	  of	  rage	   and	   righteousness,	   which	   seek	   a	   source	   of	   responsibility	   for	   their	   pain,	   in	   order	   to	  “externalize	   what	   is	   otherwise	   unendurable”	   (p.	   401).	   By	   externalizing	   the	   source	   of	  suffering,	  guilt	  is	  produced	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  privileged	  who	  themselves	  serve	  as	  proof	  of	  a	  system	   of	   suffering,	   while	   suffering	   itself	   is	   positioned	   as	   a	   social	   virtue	   (p.	   403).	  IdentiGication	  through	  ressentiment	  causes	  one	  to	  become	  morally	  superior	  by	  vilifying	  the	  power	   relations	   causing	   one’s	   subjectiGication,	   which	   ironically	   involves	   an	   involvement	  with	  one’s	  own	  impotence	  and	  injury	  even	  while	  trying	  to	  escape	  them	  (p.	  403).	  In	  this	  way,	  injured	   identities’	   history	   of	   pain	   becomes	   unredeemable,	   as	   their	   suffering	   is	   codiGied	  cyclically	  through	  basing	  all	  politically	  sensible	  claims	  in	  exclusion	  and	  injury	  (p.	  406).	  	  If	  we	  take	  both	  Spivak	  and	  Brown’s	  criticisms	  seriously,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  few	  avenues	  to	  which	  social	  justice	  as	  it	  is	  articulated	  today	  can	  be	  expressed	  sensibly	  and	  that	  does	  not	  re-­‐inscribe	  subordination	  as	  it	  is	  being	  contested.	  Combining	  the	  suggestions	  presented	  by	  each	   author,	   I	   argue	   for	   a	   social	   justice	   movement	   premised	   on	   the	   purposeful	   and	  dedicated	  deconstruction	  of	  discursively	  privileged	  consciousness.	  	  Since	   the	  subaltern	  cannot	  shape	  a	  discourse	  of	   their	   lives	  and	  realities	  due	  to	   the	  marginalizing	  effects	  of	  representation	  (Maggio,	  2007,	  p.	  426),	  I	  reframe	  the	  issue	  around	  those	   who	   can	   alter	   the	   discourse,	   namely	   those	   with	   a	   discursively	   privileged	  consciousness.	   While	   Spivak	   has	   justiGiably	   criticized	   Foucault’s	   practices,	   his	   larger	  methodology	  is	  still	  useful.	  Drawing	  on	  Foucault’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  power	  from	  the	   early	   1980’s,	   subjectivity	   is	   seen	   as	   structured	   based	   on	   the	   power	   relations	   one	  engages	   in	   (1982,	   p.	   781).	   Power	   relations	   are	   deGined	   by	   the	   modes	   of	   action	   made	  possible	   (p.	   789)	   as	   informed	  by	   regimes	  of	   truth	   that	  make	  discourses	   function	   as	   true,	  depending	   on	   their	   acquisition	   and	   retransmission	   of	   certain	   ‘truths’	   (Foucault,	   1980,	   p.	  143).	   	  Thus,	   it	   is	   theoretically	  possible	   to	  alter	   the	  discourse	  by	  altering	   the	  subject,	  who	  would	   then	   fail	   to	   respond	   to	   such	   discourses	   as	   true,	   and	   therefore	   in	   effect	   destabilize	  them.	   Such	   an	   approach	   becomes	   more	   meaningful	   as	   more	   subjects	   reject	   certain	  discourses	   and	   alter	   their	   behaviours,	   potentially	   beginning	   a	   movement.	   Since	   “the	  master’s	   tools	   will	   never	   dismantle	   the	  master’s	   house”	   (Lorde,	   2007,	   p.	   112),	   I	   suggest	  tearing	  down	  the	  house	  from	  the	  inside.	  	  Following	   Spivak’s	   (1988)	   valorization	   of	   Derrida,	   I	   argue	   for	   a	   social	   justice	  movement	   that	   sees	   the	   discursive	   creation	   of	   the	   other	   as	   an	   issue	   for	   the	   discursively	  privileged	   consciousness	   to	   absolve	   within	   ourselves,	   as	   an	   issue	   for	   the	   “benevolent	  Western	  intellectual”	  (p.	  292)	  and	  the	  European	  consciousness	  (p.	  294).	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  for	  the	   ‘Other’	   to	   justify	   themselves	   to	  me,	   but	   I	   who	  must	   deconstruct	  why	   I	   have	   thought	  them	  as	  Other.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  “letting	  the	  other(s)	  speak	  for	  [themselves]”	  (p.	  294),	  but	  rather	  listening	  to	  what	  my	  thoughts	  of	  the	  ‘Other’	  reveal	  about	  me.	  Central	  here	  is	  the	  need	  for	  the	  discursively	  privileged	  consciousness	  to	  explicitly	  place	  itself	  within	  its	  own	  context	  (Maggio,	   2007,	   p.	   424)	   to	   avoid	   the	   perils	   of	   rendering	   oneself	   transparent,	   and	   thus	  normative.	  This	  re-­‐formulation	  avoids	  the	  romanticizing	  of	  the	  subaltern	  consciousness	  as	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necessary	  to	  solve	  a	  problem	  they	  did	  not	  ignite,	  and	  rather	  spurs	  me	  to	  ask	  myself	  how	  I	  have	   contributed,	   and	   remain	   complicit,	   in	   the	   subordination	   of	   the	   oppressed	   and	  marginalized.	  	  Deconstruction	  can	  become	  politically	  meaningful	  through	  Brown’s	  (1993)	  concept	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  desire,	  whereby	  the	  Gixation	  of	  identity	  is	  avoided	  by	  focusing	  instead	  on	  the	  desire	   to	  become,	   the	   replacement	  of	   ‘I	   am’	  with	   ‘I	  want’	   (p.	  407).	   Just	  as	   the	   injured	  identity	  can	  become	  unGixed	  from	  its	  injury	  by	  reformulating	  itself	  as	  an	  active	  desire	  rather	  than	  entrenched	   in	  an	  history	  of	  exclusion	  (p.	  407),	  so	   too	  can	  my	  discursively	  privileged	  consciousness	   become	   unbound.	   I	   desire	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   my	   own	   privileges,	   oppressive	  actions	  and	  thoughts,	  to	  produce	  a	  destabilizing	  state	  of	  discomfort	  within	  myself	  that	  does	  not	   allow	   stagnation	   or	   ignorance.	   The	   politics	   of	   desire	   allows	   for	   a	   productive	   social	  justice	  movement,	  as	  identities	  do	  not	  need	  to	  reproduce	  their	  own	  injury	  and	  exclusion	  to	  desire	   emancipation.	   Therefore,	   even	   though	   I	   am	   seeking	   emancipation	   from	   my	   own	  consciousness	   and	  not	  material	   conditions,	   I	   can	  destabilize	  myself	   from	  a	   Gixed	  position	  within	  a	  privileged	  identity	  to	  desire	  something	  outside	  of	  myself.	  The	  politics	  of	  desire	  are	  especially	  signiGicant	  in	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  a	  discursively	  privileged	  consciousness,	  as	  a	  complete	  deconstruction	  may	  never	  be	  achievable,	  though	  a	  desire	  can	  be	  everlasting.	  I	  may	  never	  remove	  myself	  completely	  from	  the	  privileged	  consciousness	  I	  possess,	  but	  as	  long	  as	  I	  desire	  its	  destabilization,	  I	  am	  capable	  of	  more	  than	  it	  has	  inscribed	  on	  me.	  One	  way	  to	  imagine	  the	  politics	  of	  desire	  in	  a	  productive	  social	  justice	  movement	  is	  to	  use	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	  of	  a	  “redeemer	  of	  history”	  who	  takes	  up	  an	  “angry	  spectatorship”	  of	   their	  own	  history,	   interrogating	   its	  ethicality	  and	  morality	  while	  viewing	   it	  as	  alterable	  (Brown,	  1993,	  p.	  404).	  For	  Nietzsche,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  become	  self-­‐transformative	  through	  critically	   taking	   up	   one’s	   “genealogical	   consciousness”	   (p.	   404),	   such	   as	   an	   attempt	   by	   a	  discursively	   privileged	   consciousness	   to	   examine	   the	   history	   we	   have	   beneGited	   from	   in	  forms	  of	  systematic	  and	  institutional	  privileges.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  reduce	  the	  power	  of	  the	  past	  and	  achieve	  critical	  politics	  of	  desire	  by	  “remaking	  the	  present	  against	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  past”	  (p.	  404).	  This	  task	  is	  both	  a	  necessity,	  and	  a	  near	  impossibility	  (p.	  405),	  yet	  even	  in	  its	   pursuit,	   it	   is	   more	   productive	   than	   benevolently	   re-­‐inscribing	   marginality,	   or	   by	  attempting	   to	   forget	  a	  history	   that	  when	   ignored	  carries	  an	  even	  greater	  weight	   (p.	  405).	  Injured	  identities	  will	  have	  difGiculty	  not	  identifying	  with	  their	  importance	  until	  the	  history	  that	  has	  excluded	  them	  has	  collectively	   interrogated	  itself,	  and	  thus	  “reduces	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  determinations”	  (p.	  405).	  Rather	  than	  convince	  the	   injured	  identity	  to	   ‘forget’	  or	  move	  on,	   as	   is	   a	   common	   response	   to	   contemporary	   oppression,	   I	   argue	   that	   those	   with	   a	  discursively	  privileged	  consciousness	  should	  question	  their	  own	  identiGication	  as	  an	  abuser,	  or	  injurer.	  Not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  a	  Gixed	  position	  at	  odds	  with	  desire	  based	  politics,	  but	  as	  viewing	  abuse	  as	  a	  constant	  possibility	   in	  each	  power	  relation	   the	  discursively	  privileged	  engage	  in.	  	  As	  outlined	  by	  Brown	  (1993),	  re-­‐naturalized	  capitalist	  discourses	  are	  at	  the	  root	  of	  many	   injured	   identities,	   rather	   than	  the	  differential	  axes	  of	  race,	  gender,	  and	  sexuality	  (p.	  394).	  In	  addition,	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  (1987)	  Gind	  that	  capitalism	  discursively	  constructs	  the	  “subject	  position	  of	  the	  social	  agent”	  (p.	  82)	  by	  arranging	  behaviours	  and	  identities	  based	  on	   historically	   and	   ideologically	   created	   capitalist	   ‘interests’	   (p.	   96).	   Such	   interests	   are	  acquired	  and	  internalized	  due	  to	  their	  necessity	  in	  the	  “participation	  in	  collective	  totalities”,	  which	  inscribe	  our	  capacity	  to	  negotiate	  the	  forces	  of	  capitalism	  (p.	  96).	  As	  the	  holder	  of	  a	  discursively	  privileged	  consciousness	  capable	  of	  altering	  a	  discourse,	  and	  an	  embodiment	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of	   the	   middle-­‐class	   normative	   ideal	   buttressing	   capitalism	   (Brown,	   1993,	   p.	   395),	   it	   is	  pertinent	  that	  I	  interrogate	  the	  history	  of	  my	  interests	  and	  their	  marginalizing	  capabilities.	  Laclau	   and	   Mouffe	   (1987),	   argue	   that	   interests	   “do	   not	   exist	   independently	   of	   the	  consciousness	   of	   the	   agents”	   who	   hold	   them	   and	   are	   susceptible	   to	   “dissolution	   and	  redeGinition”	   (p.	   96).	   Thus,	   I	   recommend	   that	   a	   discursively	   privileged	   consciousness	  become	  self-­‐interrogating,	  as	  a	  ‘redeemer	  of	  History”,	  making	  possible	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  history	   through	   the	   gaze	   of	   the	   present,	   and	   lessening	   the	   weight	   of	   my	   ideologically	  created	   interests	   (p.	   99).	   Only	   through	   the	   interrogation	   of	   the	   historical	   conditions	   that	  have	  lead	  to	  the	  dissolution	  of	   identities	  (p.	  104)	  can	  emancipatory	  efforts	  be	  granted	   	  “a	  new	   depth	   and	   a	   new	   impulse”	   (p.	   105).	   Through	   the	   deconstruction	   of	  my	   discursively	  privileged	  consciousness	  I	  can	  alter	  myself	  as	  a	  subject,	  and	  thus	  have	  potential	  to	  alter	  the	  larger	  discourse.	  Neither	  theory	  nor	  multicultural	  liberalism	  can	  solve	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  oppressed	  and	  marginalized	   (Maggio,	   2007,	   p.	   420),	   as	   they	   either	   produce	   their	   own	   conditions,	  while	  reproducing	   marginalization,	   or	   depoliticize	   and	   neutralize	   difference.	   In	   a	   productive	  social	   justice	   movement,	   an	   engagement	   and	   understanding	   of	   translation	   must	   be	  incorporated.	  Translation	  avoids	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  representation,	  by	  never	  claiming	  to	  capture	  the	  original	  message,	  but	  rather	  to	  place	  the	  information	  in	  an	  understandable	  context	  (p.	  432).	  Translation	   requires	   a	  dedicated	  engagement	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	   listener	   to	   seek	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  conditions	  and	  processes	  that	  brought	  about	  the	  message	  they	  seek	  to	  grasp	   (p.	   434).	   Thus,	   if	   I	   desire	   to	   deconstruct	   my	   own	   discursively	   privileged	  consciousness	   by	   listening	   to	   the	   experiences	   of	   the	  marginalized	   and	   oppressed,	   I	  must	  also	   attempt	   to	   know	   the	   conditions	   and	   presuppositions	   that	   contextualize	   their	  statements,	  rather	  than	  have	  a	  messaged	  tailored	  to	  my	  hegemonic	  vocabulary.	  Translation	  makes	  visible	   the	  discrepancies	  between	  modes	  of	  understanding	   traditionally	  hidden	  by	  normative	   assumptions	   (p.	   436),	   thus	   making	   criticism	   of	   Western	   discourse	   necessary	  rather	  than	  exempt.	  Finally,	  translation	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  expression	  of	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  a	  discursively	  privileged	  consciousness	  always	  requires	  self-­‐awareness	  of	  being	  privileged.	  	  I	   have	   argued	   for	   a	   deconstruction	   and	   destabilization	   of	   all	   aspects	   of	   any	  discursively	   privileged	   consciousness	   as	   a	  means	   for	   the	   emancipation	   of	   the	   oppressed	  and	  marginalized.	  Applying	  Spivak	  and	  Brown’s	  critique	  of	  the	  subject,	  a	  re-­‐articulation	  has	  been	   presented	   that	   targets	   the	   discursively	   privileged	   subject	   as	   a	   means	   to	   shape	   the	  discourse.	   By	   adopting	   Derrida’s	   approach	   to	   otherization,	   executed	   using	   the	   politics	   of	  desire,	   the	   discursively	   privileged	   can	   become	   a	   ‘redeemer	   of	   history’	   through	   an	   ‘angry	  spectatorship’.	   As	   discursively	   privileged,	   we	   must	   take	   it	   upon	   ourselves	   to	   make	  emancipatory	  efforts,	  not	  by	  trying	  to	  speak	  for	  or	  represent,	  but	  through	  being	  self-­‐critical	  agents	  in	  a	  position	  to	  alter	  oppressive	  discourses.	  !!!!!!!!!
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